Sen. Grassley Grills DOJ Over FCA Dismissals

By Robert Rhoad

The False Claims Act has no stronger champion in Congress than Senator Chuck Grassley.  The spearhead of the 1986 FCA amendments recently wrote DOJ a letter to inquire about DOJ’s use of motions to dismiss declined qui tam cases.  Although one might characterize this administration’s FCA enforcement policies as less aggressive than its predecessors’, this letter demonstrates that FCA plaintiffs will still have a friend on the Hill so long as Senator Grassley holds office.

It has been unclear whether the Granston Memo would spur DOJ to dismiss more cases.  We recently published an in-depth coverage of a string of cases, which DOJ moved to dismiss, but that was merely a prominent example.  And while FCA practitioners may feel, anecdotally, that DOJ is somewhat more willing to enter the fray and exercise its dismissal authority, we do not yet have empirical evidence of a true change in practices.  Indeed, there are only a few handfuls of cases that DOJ has sought to dismiss, but nearly 700 qui tam cases filed each year.

Nonetheless, Senator Grassley perceives such a change.  One high-profile example, U.S. ex rel. Campie v. Gilead Sciences—which we covered in a Law360 Expert Analysis—seems to have drawn his attention.  In that case, which afforded the Supreme Court to weigh in on critical questions left open after Escobar (see id.), the Solicitor General urged the Supreme Court not to take the case and that, if the case were remanded, the government would move to dismiss it under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A).  This was based not only on the “merits” of the case, but also the “burdensome discovery and Touhy requests” that might follow if the case were to proceed.  Sure enough, certiorari was denied, and the government made good on its promise.  This caught Senator Grassley’s eye.

Ostensibly, his primary concern was the “preservation of government resources” rationale included in the Granston Memo and cited by DOJ in its motion to dismiss Gilead Sciences.  In the Senator’s view, this is an “attempt[] to dismiss a claim by citing litigation costs.”  We think this ignores the second half of the government’s argument in Gilead Sciences, however: “In this matter, the government has a legitimate purpose for dismissal: to avoid the additional expenditure of government resources on a case that it fully investigated and decided not to pursue.”[1]  It also ignores the full rationale articulated in the Granston Memo itself: “Preserving government resources, particularly where the government’s costs (including the opportunity costs of expending resources on other matters) are likely to exceed any expected gain.”  Justice Manual § 4-4.111 (emphasis added).

This sounds like precisely the cost-benefit analysis that Senator Grassley repeatedly admonishes the government for failing to conduct.  DOJ is not saying simply that litigation is expensive, but that these costs are not justified when compared to the findings of DOJ’s investigation in this case.

Indeed, the intervention decision itself largely serves as the cost/benefit analysis that Senator Grassley finds lacking.  The question for DOJ attorneys at the expiration of the investigatory period is whether the cost of pursuing that case are worth bearing in relation to the merits of the case, including the damages recoverable.  And when it comes to motions to dismiss, we are unaware of any case where DOJ has framed the government’s interest(s) solely in terms of cost (without relation to merit).

Senator Grassley acknowledges that even in Cimznhca—the rare case where DOJ’s motion to dismiss was denied—“DOJ moved to dismiss the claim arguing that the case lacked merit, but also because continued litigation would be costly.”  Notwithstanding a perhaps inarticulate expression at the hearing on that motion, seized upon by the district court in its opinion, DOJ has always maintained that the costs of litigation were assessed in relation to the merits of the case.[2]

Finally, Senator Grassley neglects to mention the courts’ take on DOJ motions to dismiss under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A).  The predominant, though not universal, view comes from United States ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Baird-Neece Packing Corp., 151 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 1998).  In the Ninth Circuit and jurisdictions that have followed suit, the courts will ask merely whether the government has any rational basis for dismissal.  Conservation of government resources has been accepted as such a basis.  So, while Senator Grassley may not approve of that legal standard, if he can’t convince DOJ to change course through political pressure, it may take legislative amendment to change it.

[1] U.S. ex rel. Campie v. Gilead Sciences, No. 3:11-cv-00941-EMC, ECF No. 183 at 12 (Mar. 28, 2019) (emphasis added).  Recall also that the Solicitor General expressly assailed the “merits” of the case.

[2] See Mot. to Alter or Amend Order, U.S. ex rel. Cimznhca v. UCB, Inc., ECF No. 85 at 4 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 29, 2019) (reiterating the primary basis for dismissal: “the Relator’s unsupported allegations do not justify the further expenditure of government resources”) (emphasis added).

 

NIST’s Plan for Federal Engagement in the Development of Artificial Intelligence Standards

By Andrew Victor and Robert Nichols

In February 2019, the President issued Executive Order 13859, which directed the Secretary of Commerce, through the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), to issue “a plan for Federal engagement in the development of technical standards and related tools in support or reliable, robust, and trustworthy systems in AI technology.” NIST, with public and private sector input, issued the AI plan on August 9, 2019. The plan “provides guidance regarding the important characteristics of standards to help agencies in their decision making about AI standards.”

Federal Engagement Will Promote Development of AI Standards 

The U.S. is the global leader in AI technology. NIST believes that getting the government involved in the development of AI standards will further U.S. leadership in AI. Use of standards facilitates technological advancement and market efficiency. AI standards that set forth specific guidelines will, NIST posits, ensure that AI technologies meet objectives for functionality, interoperability, and trustworthiness.

But NIST does not necessarily envision direct government involvement in the development of standards. In the U.S., the private sector typically develops standards with federal agencies contributing to and using these standards. The federal role includes sharing agency requirements with standards projects, providing technical expertise on standard development, incorporating standards into regulations, and citing standards in procurements.

NIST believes that federal contribution to and use of standards will help synthesize existing standards. Right now, AI standards are either (1) cross-sector, or horizonal, meaning that they apply across applications or industries; or (2) sector-specific, or vertical, which means they apply to specific industries like health care or transportation. NIST envisions the federal government playing a role in fostering collaboration between cross-sector and sector-specific developers.

How will the Government be Involved?

The NIST plan sets forth priorities for federal involvement. The government should prioritize AI standards that are consensus-based, inclusive and accessible, open and transparent, and globally relevant and non-discriminatory. The NIST plan also lists the type of characteristics the government should consider inusing AI standards, including whether the standards are innovative, applicable across sectors, regularly updated, effective in measuring system performance, and sensitive to ethical considerations (i.e., minimize bias and protect privacy).

NIST also discusses the various ways the government can get involved in the development of standards: (1) monitoring the development of standards, (2) participating in the development through comments, (3) influencing development through formal and informal discussions and by providing expertise, and (4) leading development by serving as a standards project editor or acting as the liaison between standards groups. Each of these levels of engagement will require qualified government participants—i.e., federal employees or government contractors.

The NIST plan further advises on some practical steps that agencies can take to begin engaging in standard development. For instance, agencies can identify technologies that can be sued to further the agency’s mission, know the existing policies and statutes that relate to use of standards, and use appropriate standards if they exist.

Finally, NIST makes more general recommendations for ways agencies can facilitate the development of reliable and robust AI technology:

  • Shore up AI standards-related knowledge and coordinate on standards development.
  • Promote focused research to explore how aspects of trustworthiness can be incorporated into standards and standards-related tools.
  • Support and expand public-private partnerships in developing standards.
  • Strategically engage with international parties to advance AI standards for U.S. economic and security needs.

Takeaways

The NIST plan provides guidance on how the government should engage with the development of AI standards, but we don’t yet know the exact steps agencies will take in this development. It is clear, however, that the federal government is encouraged to partner with the private sector, which means government contractors will likely participate in developing standards. Contractors will thus have an opportunity to define AI standards and determine how they are incorporated into regulations and solicitations going forward.

Answers to Your Questions About the New Rule Prohibiting Acquisitions of Equipment from Chinese Telecom Companies

By Andrew Victor and Robert Nichols

You’ve probably heard that the U.S. Government is worried that Chinese telecom companies like Huawei and ZTE are spying on us.  Although these companies offer U.S. businesses low cost telecom equipment and services, they are legally required to assist the Chinese government in intelligence operations.  In response to this threat, Congress enacted section 889(a)(1)(A) of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization of Act for FY 2019, which prohibits the federal government from acquiring telecom services or supplies from Huawei and ZTE.  The FAR Council recently issued an interim rule implementing section 889(a)(1)(A).  Here’s answers to some FAQs contractors have about the new rule:

What does the new rule say?

The new rule adds a new section to FAR Part 4 and new contract clauses to Part 52 that prohibit agencies from “procuring or obtaining, or extending or renewing a contract to procure or obtain, any equipment, system, or service that uses covered telecommunications equipment or services as a substantial or essential component of any system, or as critical technology as part of any system.”

How does the new rule define “covered telecommunications equipment and services”? 

Under FAR 4.2101 “covered telecommunications equipment and services” refers to equipment and services produced by Huawei Technologies Company or ZTE Corporation, as well as to their affiliates and subsidiaries.

How does the new rule define “substantial or essential component”?

A “substantial or essential component” is any component necessary for the proper function or performance of a piece of equipment, system, or service.

How does the new rule define “critical technology”?

“Critical technology” includes items listed on the United States Munitions List, the Commerce List, nuclear equipment. Basically, “critical technology” refers to things related to national defense—e.g., weapons, missile technology, information related to nuclear proliferation.

When does the new rule go into effect?

The new rule applies to all solicitations issued after August 13, 2019.  It also applies to contracts executed after August 13, 2019, even if the solicitation was issued before that date.  Contracting officers are also required to modify existing IDIQ contracts to include the new FAR clause in future orders.  What’s more, agencies must include the clause whenever they extend the period of performance—including the exercise of an option year—of an existing contract.

What are contractors’ obligations under the rule?

Under FAR 52.204-24 (the new clause now required in all solicitations), offerors must explicitly represent that they either will or will not be providing equipment or services from Huawei or ZTE. If a contractor plans to provide “covered equipment and services” it must: (1) provide the brand and model number of any equipment; (2) provide the name, entity identifier, and CAGE Code of any entity providing services or equipment; and (3) explain how the equipment and services will be used in performing the contract.

Notably, we have received inquiries from clients whether the U.S. Government maintains a list of Huawei and ZTE affiliates and subsidiaries.  Our contacts at government agencies are unaware of a centrally-maintained list.  Regulatory implementation of section 889(a)(1)(A)’s restrictions places the onus on contractors to ensure their supply chains lack the prohibited equipment.

Can the government waive the prohibition on equipment and services from Huawei and ZTE?

Yes, under FAR 4.2104, the head of an executive agency may, on a one-time basis, waive the prohibition.  To obtain a waiver, a government entity must provide (1) a compelling justification for additional time needed to implement the new rule, (2) a complete description of the equipment and services used, and (3) a plan to phase them out.  The waiver may not extend past August 13, 2021.

What happens if a contractor discovers that it or one of its subcontractors is using prohibited equipment or services?

Under FAR 52.204-24, the contractor must report the use of covered equipment within one business day of discovery. The contractor shall file the report with a contracting officer or, if it’s a DoD contract, submit a report to https://dibnet.dod.mil.  The report must include information about mitigation actions taken and recommended.  Within 10 days of the initial report, the contractor must provide any further information about steps taken to mitigate.

What happens if a contractor misrepresents or does not report use of prohibited equipment or services?

The agency could terminate the contract and it might also sue the contractor for re-procurement costs.  Further, the U.S. Government, through the Department of Justice, may pursue other remedies, such as a suit under the False Claims Act.

DoD Takes Next Step in Developing Its Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification

By Andrew Victor and Robert Nichols

DoD recently released updated guidance, a draft version 0.4 of its the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) model and requested industry feedback. This post follows up on our previous post in this area and explains the CMMC model.

DoD’s guidance explains that version 0.4 of the CMMC model organizes cybersecurity best practices into 18 “domains”:

  • Access Control
  • Asset Management
  • Awareness and Training
  • Audit & Accountability
  • Configuration Management
  • Cybersecurity Governance
  • Identification and Authentication
  • Incident Response
  • Maintenance
  • Media Protection
  • Personnel Security
  • Physical Protection
  • Recovery
  • Risk Assessment
  • Security Assessment
  • Situational Awareness
  • System and Communications Protection
  • System and Information Integrity

For each domain, the CMMC establishes “key sets of capabilities for cybersecurity,” which are practices and processes classified by maturity level; Level 1, the most basic, to Level 5, the most advanced.  Notably, version 0.4 dramatically expands the number of practices for each maturity level. For instance, version 0.3 had 17 practices for Level 1, “Basic Cyber Hygiene,” and 46 practices for Level 2, “Intermediate Cyber Hygiene.”  Version 0.4 added 18 practices to Level 1 for a total of 35 and 69 practices to Level 2 for a total of 115.

In setting forth the capabilities for each domain across the five maturity levels, version 0.4 includes a citation to the external standard that DoD has looked to for each practice.  DoD’s sources for version 0.4 include NIST SP 800-171, standards developed by the Defense Industrial Base Sector Coordinating Council, and the CERT Resilience Management Model, among others.  Given the length and complexity of version 0.4, DoD explained that it continues to refine the model and anticipates a reduction in the model’s size.

Going forward, contractors should consider whether to submit feedback as invited by DoD by September 25th.  In particular, DoD has asked industry to answer the following questions:

  1. What do you recommend removing or de-prioritizing to simplify the model and why?
  2. Which elements provide high value to your organization?
  3. Which practices would you move or cross-reference between levels and domains?
  4. In preparation for the pending easy-to-use assessment guidance, what recommendations might you have to clarify practices and processes?

Contractors should also continue to monitor the CMMC website for new information and the release of version 0.6 in November.

Related but Not Connected: How COFC Declined Jurisdiction Over Other Transactions Agreements

By Andrew Victor

In Space Exploration Technologies Corp. v. United States (Aug. 26, 2019), the Court of Federal Claims determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear a protest of an other transactions agreement (OTA). The OTA award was related to a FAR-governed procurement, but this was not enough of a jurisdictional hook.

DoD is authorized to enter into OTAs, which are agreements that are not procurement contracts or cooperative agreements. 10 U.S.C. § 2371. DoD enters OTAs to fund research and development. Because OTAs are not procurement contracts, they are not subject the federal statues or regulations—including the FAR—that govern procurements.

In Space Exploration, the Air Force issued a solicitation for OTAs to develop space launch services, including rocket propulsion systems and launch vehicles. The solicitation was part of multi-step program to maintain space security. Under the initial OTAs, the Air Force would fund development of prototype launch systems. Then, under Phase 2 of the program, the Air Force would conduct an open competition, not limited to the Phase 1 participants, and award contracts for launch services.

The Air Force awarded launch development OTAs to three offerors: Blue Origin, LLC; United Launch Alliance, LLC; and Orbital Sciences Corporation. As a disappointed offeror, Space Exploration Technologies Corp. (SpaceX) filed a COFC protest challenging the Air Force’s evaluation. But the court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

COFC is authorized to hear bid protests under the Tucker Act, which grants the court jurisdiction over protests challenging the “award of a contract or any alleged violation of statute or regulation in connection with a procurement . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1).

While OTAs are not procurement contracts, SpaceX argued the development OTAs were made “in connection with a procurement.” It argued that they were clearly related to the Phase 2 procurement, which would be an open competition conducted under the FAR. Indeed, it was evident, at least to SpaceX, that the contractors who developed prototypes under the OTAs would compete to provide the launch services in Phase 2.

But the court found that the development OTAs and the Phase 2 procurement were like out-of-touch cousins—related but not connected to each other. The court found the following distinguishing factors compelling:

  • The development OTAs and Phase 2 procurement involved separate solicitations. Each was a distinct step, with different time frames and objectives, in a multi-phase program.
  • The OTAs and the Phase 2 procurement employed different acquisition strategies. The OTAs relied on DoD’s authority to enter OTAs; Phase 2 was a FAR-based competition.
  • The OTAs and Phase 2 procurement had different goals. The OTAs were intended to increase the pool of launch vehicles. The goal of the Phase 2 procurement was to actually acquire launch services.
  • The OTAs did not seek actual goods and services, while Phase 2 involved the procurement of tangible launch services.
  • SpaceX conceded it would compete in Phase 2 even though it had not received a Phase 1 OTA.

SpaceX had moved in the alternative for a change of venue to a court in which it could have brought the case if the COFC ruled against it.  It did so under 28 U.S.C. § 1631, which allows a federal court to transfer a case to another venue if it could have been properly brought in that venue and if the transfer serves the interests of justice. Here, the COFC transferred the case to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, where both SpaceX and the Air Force office that awarded the OTAs are located  It found that SpaceX had asserted non-frivolous claims about the Air Force’s evaluation, and so a transfer served the interests of justice.

Here are the takeaways from the decision:

First, SpaceX  indicates that the COFC is hesitant to entertain protests of OTAs.

Second, if a contractor does challenge an OTA before the COFC, the connection between the OTA and some other FAR-government procurement must be robust, such as being a required entry into a later procurement.

Third, if a contractor cannot challenge an OTA before COFC, it may protest in federal district court.

Fourth, regardless of whether you’re before the COFC or a district court, when opposing a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, move in the alternative for a transfer of venue.

 

AseraCare is here! And in our clinical judgment, the Eleventh Circuit is not objectively wrong

By Robert Rhoad, and Jason Lynch

Most False Claims Act (“FCA”) watchers have known that AseraCare was coming.  The case addresses a common question in health care fraud cases: when, if ever, can a doctor’s clinical judgment regarding a patient’s prognosis be “false”?  After a tortured procedural history, we have a thoroughly reasoned answer from the Eleventh Circuit: “a reasonable difference of opinion among physicians reviewing medical documentation ex post is not sufficient on its own to suggest that those judgments—or any claims based on them—are false under the FCA.”[1]

The case concerns the hospice benefit under Medicare.  The requirements for that benefit can be summarized as follows.[2]  A patient is eligible for the benefit if she is terminally ill, meaning that she has six months or less to live.  That prognosis must be made by a physician, who certifies as much in writing.  That certification must be included in the patient’s medical record, along with supporting documentation.  Once admitted to the hospice, the patient must be re-certified periodically.  The Medicare framework recognizes that physicians’ judgments will not be perfect: it will not deny benefits merely because the patient lives longer than six months, or even if the patient is ultimately discharged (alive) from hospice care.

The relators alleged that AseraCare, the owner and operator of some 60 hospices across 19 states, was knowingly claiming hospice benefits for patients who were ineligible.  The government intervened and mostly based its case on a statistical sampling model, which, while hotly contested in district court, was not addressed on appeal.

Seeking summary judgment, AseraCare put a straightforward question to the district court: is the Government’s medical expert opinion enough, on its own, to establish falsity of AseraCare’s claims?  The district court denied AseraCare’s motion and set the case down for trial.[3]

That is where the case took a curious turn.  The district court granted AseraCare’s motion to bifurcate the trial: Phase I for falsity and Phase II for knowledge.[4]  That way, the jury would not be prejudiced by evidence of AseraCare’s knowledge as the jurors tried to determine whether the claims were false to begin with.  This led, predictably, to heated disputes over whether certain evidence went to falsity or knowledge.  With regard to “pattern and practice” evidence, in particular, the government argued strenuously that it went to both knowledge and falsity.[5]  But the district court disagreed and kept the evidence out of Phase I.

Phase I took eight weeks to try.  The government’s medical expert testified at length about how 123 of the 223 patients sampled (from a universe of 2,180) were not, in fact, terminally ill and thus, were ineligible for hospice benefits.  Nevertheless, the expert expressly stopped short of opining that AseraCare’s medical expertwas “wrong.”[6]  The jury was thus presented with “a fundamental difference of professional opinion” and had its role reduced to reviewing medical records and deciding which expert’s testimony was more persuasive.[7]  Importantly, there was never any dispute that each patient’s certifications were supported and documented; the only dispute was whether the certifying physicians were correct in their diagnoses.

After the jury found overwhelmingly for the government, the district court began to have second thoughts.  Observing the trial itself left the court “convinced” that “a difference of opinion is not enough,” and that it had committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury as such.[8]  The court set aside the jury’s verdict and ordered a new trial with new jury instructions.

But it also went one step further.  After ordering a new trial, the district court (sua sponte) ordered summary-judgment briefing on the question whether the evidence adduced in Phase I could, as a matter of law, establish falsity.  The court granted summary judgment to AseraCare, holding that the government had “presented no evidence of an objective falsehood for any of the patients at issue.”[9]  The government appealed both summary judgment and the grant of a new trial.

The legal issue prompting a new trial is the more consequential issue, and it was addressed first by the Eleventh Circuit.  Canvassing the statutory and regulatory framework for hospice benefits under Medicare, the court found that the “framework signals, and CMS itself has acknowledged, that no [] certitude can be expected of physicians in the practice of treating end-of-life illness.”[10] Because the certification implicates the physician’s clinical judgment, that certification cannot be false unless it reflects an “objective falsehood.”[11]  Thus, “the mere difference of reasonable opinion between physicians, without more,” is not enough.[12]

That left the question of what “more” would suffice.  The Eleventh Circuit offered three examples:

  1. Where a certifying physician fails to review a patient’s medical records or otherwise familiarize himself with the patient’s condition before making the diagnosis.
  2. Where a plaintiff proves that a physician did not, in fact, subjectively believe that his patient was terminally ill at the time of certification.
  3. Where expert evidence proves that no reasonable physician could have concluded that a patient was terminally ill given the relevant medical records.[13]

Going forward, plaintiffs will likely try to fit their claims into one or more of these buckets.  This is the principal teaching of AseraCare.

While agreeing that a new trial was warranted, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment.  Remember the evidence that was excluded, over the government’s objections, from Phase I?  The court of appeals agreed that at least some of it was probative of falsity, as well as knowledge.  Thus, the district court should have considered summary judgment, if at all, based on the whole record—not just the record admitted in Phase I of the trial.

The primary holding is undoubtedly that mere disagreement of medical experts, without more, will not suffice to prove falsity.  This will resonate throughout federal health care cases, many of which turn on physician certifications of medical judgment, of the sort in AseraCare.  Secondarily, while not forbidding the kind of bifurcation that occurred in the district court, the resulting confusion over the proper record—and the Eleventh Circuit’s intimation that evidence is not so easily bifurcated between falsity and knowledge—defendants are unlikely to see such bifurcation again in the future.

 

[1] United States v. AseraCare, Inc., — F.3d. –, 2019 WL 4251875, at *15 (11th Cir. Sept. 9, 2019).

[2] For the applicable statutes and regulations, see id. at *2-3 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395f(7)(A) (requiring physician certification that patient is “terminally ill”), 1395x(dd)(3)(A) (defining “terminally ill,” as a life expectancy of six months or less); 42 C.F.R. § 418.22(b)(2) (requiring accompanying “[c]linical information and other documentation that support the medical prognosis” to be included “in the medical record with the written certification)); see also id. at *10-13.

[3] The district court found AseraCare’s proposed “reasonable doctor” standard “appealing and logical,” though unprecedented in the Eleventh Circuit, and even certified the question for interlocutory appeal.  Id. at *5.  Unfortunately for all involved, the court of appeals declined to step in at that time.  Id.  Had it done so, years of ultimately futile litigation might have been avoided.

[4] The bifurcation issue was not raised on appeal.  See id. at *6 n.5 (“The Government continues to complain on appeal that bifurcation of the trial was ‘fundamentally unfair’ and confused the issues, albeit it does not expressly challenge on appeal the district court’s decision.”).

[5] Id. at *6.

[6] Id. at *6.

[7] Id. at *7.

[8] Id. at *8.

[9] Id. at *9.

[10] Id. at *14.

[11] Id. at *14.

[12] Id. at *18 (emphasis added).

[13] Id. at *15.

Uncertainty surrounds quick relief from foreign aid cuts

By Paul M. Krawzak and Kellie Mejdrich, CQ

Aug. 20, 2019

Lawmakers and stakeholders opposed to the possible cancellation of more than $4 billion in previously appropriated foreign assistance funds have limited options to combat the White House’s move, expected sometime this week.

The quickest route could be a lawsuit by aid groups and federal contractors that receive State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development funds seeking an immediate injunction, which would block such “rescissions” from taking effect. Click here to download the article.

[pdf-embedder url=”https://nichols.law/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/CQ-Article-on-Rescission_republished_by-NIchols-Liu_with_permission.pdf” title=”19-5-1 When The King No Longer Wants You Suing In His Name”]

Collection of Key Resources on the Administration’s Rescission of Foreign Assistance Appropriations

Overview of the White House’s attempt to block unobligated FY19 foreign assistance appropriations, with FAQs, legal analyses, government documents, and press reports.

At a Glance

OMB claims that President Trump has the power to freeze appropriations until after they expire. GAO maintains that such action would violate the Constitution’s Separation of Powers and the Impoundment Control Act (ICA) – the very statute Congress enacted to curb similar abuses by President Nixon. At stake is $4.3 billion in unobligated foreign assistance appropriations due to expire September 30.

According to press reports, the Administration intends to send an ICA notice to Congress on August 20 requesting rescission of the targeted funds. This action seeks to take advantage of a perceived loophole in the statute: the notice automatically freezes the funds for 45 days, effectively running out the clock on the FY19 appropriations that expire September 30. In doing so, the White House hopes to achieve the foreign-assistance budget cuts that it previously requested but Congress explicitly rejected.

The frozen funds cover a variety of foreign assistance: international organizations, peacekeeping operations, international narcotics control and law enforcement, development aid, assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia, economic support funding, foreign military financing programs, and global health programs.

Not all foreign-assistance funds are being treated equally by Defendants. For arbitrary and capricious reasons, they have carved out projects dear to certain high-ranking administration officials, such as Vice President Pence and Ivanka Trump. This shows that White House’s actions are not only illegal, but they are arbitrary and capricious.

Read More>>

Strategy for Challenging the Administration’s Impoundment of Foreign Assistance Appropriations

By Robert Nichols

In our article this past Sunday, we opined that OMB likely would be acting illegally if it tried to use the Impoundment Control Act (“ICA”) to run out the clock on the FY19 appropriations, or if it froze funds without timely notifying Congress.

Yesterday afternoon, Bloomberg reported that the White House intends to send a request to Congress on August 20 seeking rescission of unobligated funds in foreign assistance appropriations.  Additionally, OMB is imposing a daily spending limit of 2% of those unobligated funds per day, to block the agencies from distributing the funds before the end of the fiscal year.

The August 20 rescission notice may constitute a legal violation unless the Administration commits to releasing the funds “in sufficient time . . .  to be prudently obligated,” as GAO’s General Counsel has opined.[1]  Furthermore, the 2% cap would likely qualify as an illegal impoundment if OMB failed to timely notify Congress of this action.[2]

Several interested parties have asked us to outline a legal strategy for challenging both the anticipated rescission notice and 2% cap.  While more research is necessary, our initial thinking is informed by the ongoing lawsuit filed by the Sierra Club to stop President Trump’s reprograming of appropriated funds to pay for a border wall.  Several key takeaways from that litigation provide a good outline for such a challenge here.

Border Wall Litigation

When Congress refused to appropriate several billion dollars for construction of a border wall, President Trump declared that he would proceed with or without Congress’ blessing.  OMB reprogramed funding from various appropriations passed for other purposes, citing the National Emergencies Act (“NEA”)[3] and other fiscal statutes.  The Administration also waived the requirement for an Environmental Impact Statement for the border wall construction; that action triggered a response that President Trump may not have anticipated.

On February 19, 2019, the Sierra Club sued President Trump and his Cabinet in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California.  The private party asked the District Court for an injunction against the Administration’s abuse of the fiscal laws to reprogram funds to a purpose not intended by Congress.  The White House, represented by the U.S. Department of Justice, opposed the request for injunctive relief.

On May 24, the District Court ruled for the Sierra Club and entered an injunction against the Administration.[4]  The Court focused its analysis on the application of the Constitution and the fiscal laws:[5]

The case is not about whether the challenged border barrier construction plan is wise or unwise. It is not about whether the plan is the right or wrong policy response to existing conditions at the southern border of the United States.  These policy questions are the subject of extensive, and often intense, differences of opinion, and this Court cannot and does not express any view as to them.

Assessing whether Defendants’ actions not only conform to the Framers’ contemplated division of powers among co-equal branches of government but also comply with the mandates of Congress set forth in previously unconstrued statutes presents a Gordian knot of sorts.  But the federal courts’ duty is to decide cases and controversies . . . .

Considering the Sierra Club’s request for relief, the District Court cautioned “[a] preliminary injunction is a matter of equitable discretion and is ‘an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.’”  The Court recited the legal standard that, to obtain preliminary injunctive relief, the plaintiff must establish:

  • that it is likely to succeed on, or raises serious questions about, the merits;
  • that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief;
  • that the balance of equities tips in its favor; and
  • that an injunction is in the public interest.

The Court walked through each factor and found that the Sierra Club met its burden.  The crux of the analysis focused on the Court’s conclusion that the Administration’s reprogramming of funds likely violates the Constitution’s Separation of Powers, Congress’s most recent appropriations legislation, and the President’s statutory authorities regarding the handling of appropriated funds.  The Court found that:[6]

Congress’s “absolute” control over federal expenditures—even when that control may frustrate the desires of the Executive Branch regarding initiatives it views as important—is not a bug in our constitutional system.  It is a feature of that system, and an essential one. . . .  The Appropriations Clause is “a bulwark of the Constitution’s separation of powers among the three branches of the National Government,” and is “particularly important as a restraint on Executive Branch officers.” . . . Because the Court has found that Plaintiffs are likely to show that Defendants’ actions exceeded their statutory authority, and that irreparable harm will result from those actions, a preliminary injunction must issue pending a resolution of the merits of the case.

The Justice Department argued that the Sierra Club, a private party, has no standing to challenge the Administration’s use of Federal appropriations.  The District Court disagreed.  It found that the Sierra Club had met the Supreme Court’s standard for establishing standing:  the Sierra Club’s members would suffer an injury fairly traceable to the Administration’s reprogramming of funds, and the injury could be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.

Over the next several weeks, the District Court considered whether to issue a permanent injunction against the reprogramming.  Both the Sierra Club and the Administration, as well as various amici curiae (friends of the court), submitted briefs and testimony on the matter.  On June 28, the Court issued a second order confirming that the Administration had illegally reprogrammed appropriated funds for a purpose unintended by Congress.[7]  It then issued a permanent injunction against this unlawful fiscal action.

The Administration appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  Justice Department lawyers sought to stay the permanent injunction while the Circuit Court reviewed the District Court’s ruling; however, DOJ did not contest the Sierra Club’s standing (at least for purposes of lifting the injunction).  On July 3, the Circuit Court issued a lengthy opinion siding with the Sierra Club on both the illegality of the Administration’s funding actions and the Sierra Club’s standing.  It ordered that the injunction remain in place while the Circuit Court continued to consider other facets of the case.

The Administration immediately appealed to the Supreme Court.  On July 26, the Supreme Court issued a 5-4 decision releasing the funds during the pendency of the appeal at the Circuit Court.[8]  The majority stated that the Administration had raised sufficient doubt about there is a private cause of action to question the reprogramming of funds under one of the fiscal statutes in play.  Justice Breyer’s opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, observed that “[t]his case raises novel and important questions about the ability of private parties to enforce Congress’ appropriations power.”

Take-Aways From Sierra Club

We glean five key points from the Sierra Club litigation.

First, the District Court found that the Administration violated the law when it reprogrammed funds away from their intended purposes, and it granted an injunction halting the President’s actions.  The Court steadfastly focused on the Administration’s actions under the law, not on the policy differences that are motivating the litigants.

Second, a private party initiated the litigation.  The District Court and Circuit Court found that it has standing to do so, leading the Justice Department to concede the point at the Circuit Court (at least for purposes of seeking to lift the injunction).  However, at the Solicitor General’s urging, the Supreme Court questioned whether the Sierra Club has the right to enforce the fiscal statutes on which it is relying.  This issue remains in play.

Third, neither Congress nor GAO brought this litigation, nor is either participating in it as a plaintiff.  The U.S. House of Representatives and individual Members of Congress have joined the suit only as non-plaintiff amici curiae.[9]

Fourth, the Supreme Court released the funds for the Administration to spend while the Circuit Court continues its review of the District Court’s ruling.  The contrast in opinions between the California-based District Court and Circuit Court and the right-leaning Supreme Court should not go unnoticed.

Fifth, litigation such as this can move very quickly, requiring a comprehensive understanding of both appropriations law and legal rights of action to enforce fiscal laws.  Neither of these issues has been finally resolved by the courts.

Strategy for a Possible Challenge

In our view, any legal strategy to challenge the Administration’s impoundment of foreign assistance appropriations must involve three steps.

  1. One or more contractors and/or NGOs would need to sign on as plaintiffs in a lawsuit and demonstrate that they will suffer harm from the Administration’s funding impoundments. Having other interested parties join the lawsuit—the House of Representatives, GAO, individual Members of Congress, and trade associations—would be helpful but may not be essential, given the ruling in Sierra Club.
  2. Counsel would need to quickly nail down the legal arguments and draft a complaint addressing three issues:

    a. establishing that the plaintiffs meet the standards for standing;

    b. arguing that the Administration’s impoundments of the foreign assistance appropriations—

        • constitutes an illegal, de facto line item veto;
        • violates the Constitution’s Separation of Powers;
        • violates the Impoundment Control Act;
        • violates the foreign assistance appropriations statutes; and
        • possibly violates the Administrative Procedures Act.

    c. identifying the relief sought, which likely would include—

        • enjoining OMB from using any rescission package to “run out the clock” on the FY19 funding;
        • enjoining OMB from imposing the 2% cap on spending as an illegal impoundment of funds;
        • making the funds available during the pendency of the lawsuit; and
        • possibly making the funds available for a commensurate period after the fiscal year has expired.
  3. Once the complaint is written, counsel could send it to OMB—without identifying the plaintiffs—as a warning shot before filing the lawsuit. This may very well cause the Administration to abandon its impoundment actions, at least for this year.  If not, the suit could be filed immediately.

This course of action obviously is not without litigation and political risks.  As the Sierra Club litigation shows, however, parties harmed by the Administration’s misuse of the fiscal laws may have a right to be heard—and might even be able to curb the President’s injurious disregard of fiscal laws.

[1] Impoundment Control Act—Withholding of Funds through Their Date of Expiration, B-330330 (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/695889.pdf.

[2] See 2 U.S.C. §§ 682-684 (requiring notice to Congress of any impoundment of appropriated funds).

[3] 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651.

[4] Sierra Club v. Trump, 379 F. Supp. 3d 883 (N.D. Cal. 2019).

[5] See id. at 891 (citations omitted) (citing In re Aiken Cty., 725 F.3d 255, 257 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“The underlying policy debate is not our concern . . . .  Our more modest task is to ensure, in justiciable cases, that agencies comply with the law as it has been set by Congress.”) (ellipsis in original)).

[6] Id. at 927-28 (citations omitted).

[7] Sierra Club v. Trump, No. 4:19-cv-00892-HSG, 2019 WL 2715422 (N.D. Cal. June 28, 2019).

[8] See Trump v. Sierra Club, 588 U. S. ____ (2019), available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/19a60_o75p.pdf.

[9] Having said that, the U.S. House of Representatives did bring a separate lawsuit seeking a preliminary injunction in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.  The District Judge dismissed that suit stating that, “while the Constitution bestows upon Members of the House many powers, it does not grant them standing to hale the Executive Branch into court claiming a dilution of Congress’s legislative authority.”  U.S. House of Representatives v. Mnuchin, 379 F. Supp. 3d 8, 11 (D.D.C. 2019).  That opinion has been strongly criticized by legal scholars and is now on appeal.

DoD Shares Details in Developing Its Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification

By Andrew Victor and Robert Nichols

The Department of Defense Office of the Under Secretary of Acquisition and Sustainment has shared new details on its new cybersecurity certification standard for defense contractors, the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC).

To recap, DoD’s current cybersecurity rule, DFARS 252.204-7012, requires contractors to comply with the requirements of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP) 800-171.  NIST SP 800-171 sets forth requirements for, among other things, system access, user identification and authorization, and incident response.  The NIST standard, however, does not require any kind of certification.  DoD is designing the CMMC to address this deficiency in the existing cybersecurity framework, particularly with respect to Controlled Unclassified Information disclosed to contractors.

The CMMC will combine NIST SP 800-171 and other cybersecurity standards—including the Aerospace Industries Association’s National Aerospace Standard 9933 and the United Kingdom’s Cyber Essentials Scheme—into a unified cybersecurity standard.  Importantly, CMMC will require contractors to certify their compliance with a third-party auditor.  Contractors can obtain different levels of certification—ranging from Basic to Advanced/Progressive—based on their level of sophistication.  Solicitations will specify the required certification level on a contract-by-contract basis.  DoD hopes that the CMMC will be self-automated and cost-effective so that even small businesses can achieve Level 1 Basic certification.

At an industry day event on July 29th, DoD released a short presentation summarizing where the CMMC stands in development.  Here are our takeaways for government contractors:

  • DoD continues to believe that the vast majority of defense industrial base companies lack good cyber hygiene and instead have an ad hoc approach that permits low-level cyberattacks to succeed. Companies should consider investing in improving their cyber hygiene now to capture a competitive advantage once the CMMC requirements become “baked” into solicitations.
  • DoD is currently working with the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory and the Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute to develop a unified standard for cybersecurity. The standards that will comprise the CMMC are not finalized and will be subject to revision over the coming months.
  • In the midst of an iterative process, DoD intends to issue draft standards and obtain industry feedback, culminating in publicly released standard by January 2020.
  • Contractors can expect to see the CMMC requirements to begin appearing in solicitations next summer. Change is imminent and contractors must be proactive in order to ensure their success.